Volume 20, Issue 2 (6-2025)
J. Mon. Ec. 2025, 20(2): 251-274 |
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Hashemi Mehneh S M, Ahadi Serkani Y, Hamidian M. Designing a Regulatory Governance Model for Investment Policy in Iran’s Social Insurance Funds: An Institutional Approach with Emphasis on the Central Bank’s Role. J. Mon. Ec. 2025; 20 (2) :251-274
URL: http://jme.mbri.ac.ir/article-1-713-en.html
URL: http://jme.mbri.ac.ir/article-1-713-en.html
1- Instructor of PhD student specializing in financial management, Faculty of Economics and Accounting, Azad University, South Tehran Branch,Iran
2- Associate Professor of Accounting, Faculty of Accounting and Management, Islamic Azad University
3- Associate Professor, Department of Economics and Accounting, South Tehran Azad University
2- Associate Professor of Accounting, Faculty of Accounting and Management, Islamic Azad University
3- Associate Professor, Department of Economics and Accounting, South Tehran Azad University
Abstract: (865 Views)
This study develops an evidence-based regulatory governance model for investment policy in Iran’s social insurance funds, emphasizing the strategic and supervisory role of the Central Bank. Using a qualitative grounded theory approach, 18 semi-structured interviews were conducted with policymakers, financial regulators, central bank officials, fund managers, and independent experts. The data were coded in three stages (open, axial, selective) and triangulated with secondary data. Comparative insights from Norway, Canada, and the Netherlands were incorporated.
Four institutional challenges were identified: overlapping roles, fragmented oversight, conflicts of interest, and lack of developmental performance metrics. The proposed model integrates strategic investment policy, multi-tier regulatory oversight, outcome-based accountability, and participatory institutional alignment. The model addresses gaps between monetary regulation and social investment governance, offering a phased implementation roadmap adaptable to Iran’s legal and institutional context. Comparative analysis highlights similarities and limitations relative to global practices. This article contributes a context-specific yet internationally informed framework linking institutional theory with practical governance reform in emerging economies.
Four institutional challenges were identified: overlapping roles, fragmented oversight, conflicts of interest, and lack of developmental performance metrics. The proposed model integrates strategic investment policy, multi-tier regulatory oversight, outcome-based accountability, and participatory institutional alignment. The model addresses gaps between monetary regulation and social investment governance, offering a phased implementation roadmap adaptable to Iran’s legal and institutional context. Comparative analysis highlights similarities and limitations relative to global practices. This article contributes a context-specific yet internationally informed framework linking institutional theory with practical governance reform in emerging economies.
Keywords: Investment Governance, Financial Regulation, Social Insurance Funds, Institutional Conflict of Interest, Strategic Policymaking
Type of Study: Original Research - Case Study |
Subject:
Economics
Received: 18 Jul 2025 | Accepted: 16 Sep 2025 | Published: 5 Oct 2025
Received: 18 Jul 2025 | Accepted: 16 Sep 2025 | Published: 5 Oct 2025
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